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O P I N I O N 
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Roger Henderson appeals the District Court’s 
determination that he was an Armed Career Criminal 
pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e).  To resolve this case, we must determine 
whether 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780–113(f)(1) of Pennsylvania’s 
Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act is 
“divisible” and subject to the modified categorical approach 
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in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathis v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).  We find that it is, and that the 
District Court properly used the modified categorical 
approach to determine that Henderson had three qualifying 
predicate offenses under ACCA.  We will affirm. 
I.  
 The underlying facts are not in dispute.  On October 6, 
2012, detectives who were conducting surveillance on a 
middle school in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania observed 
Henderson in the bleachers with a firearm and called 
uniformed police officers to the scene.  When the uniformed 
officers arrived, Henderson slid the firearm from his 
waistband, placed it behind a seat, and walked away.  The 
uniformed officers recovered the weapon and placed 
Henderson under arrest after recognizing him as a known 
felon. 
 A grand jury returned an indictment charging 
Henderson with unlawful possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 
924(e)(1).  Henderson entered a guilty plea on March 6, 2014.  
Henderson’s Presentence Investigation Report revealed that 
Henderson had at least three qualifying convictions for 
serious drug offenses within the meaning of ACCA.1  
                                              
1 If convicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g), ACCA provides 
for a minimum fifteen year sentence when a defendant has 
three previous convictions for serious drug offenses.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (“In the case of a person who violates 
section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions 
by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a 
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Henderson objected to the classification of two of his prior 
convictions as serious drug offenses.  The District Court 
disagreed, finding that three of Henderson’s prior convictions 
were ACCA serious drug offenses within the meaning of 
ACCA.   
 Specifically, the District Court, referencing various 
charging instruments and other pertinent documents, found 
that Henderson had separate convictions for possession with 
intent to deliver cocaine on June 25, 2002; possession with 
intent to deliver cocaine on January 25, 2004;2 and possession 
with intent to deliver heroin on March 13, 2009.  Each 
conviction was for a violation of 35 Pa. Stat. Ann § 780–
113(a)(30), and the District Court concluded that each 
conviction constituted “a serious drug offense within the 
meaning of the ACCA.”  (App. 11.)  Henderson was 
sentenced to the mandatory minimum prison term of fifteen 
years.  This appeal followed.   
II.  
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
                                                                                                     
violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed 
on occasions different from one another, such person shall be 
fined under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen 
years”). 
2 The substance charged in the underlying state court 
indictment actually was heroin, not cocaine, as stated by the 
District Court.  The District Court’s error is inconsequential.  
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§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We exercise plenary review 
over purely legal questions, such as Henderson’s legal 
challenge to the District Court’s application of ACCA.  See 
United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 690 (3d. Cir. 2003).  
We review Henderson’s challenge to the constitutionality of 
ACCA de novo. See United States v. Fontaine, 697 F.3d 221, 
225 n.7 (3d Cir. 2012).   
III.  
 Henderson argues that two of his previous convictions 
do not qualify as serious drug offenses under ACCA.  We 
disagree.3 
                                              
3 Henderson also challenges the constitutionality of 
ACCA, arguing that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights 
were violated when his sentence was increased due to three 
prior convictions that were not charged in the indictment.  As 
Henderson concedes, however, this argument is foreclosed by 
Almendarez–Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).  
Justice Thomas, concurring in Descamps v. United States, 
133 S. Ct. 2276, 2295 (2013), observed that the Supreme 
Court has not yet reconsidered Almendarez–Torres, which 
draws an exception to the Apprendi line of cases for judicial 
fact-finding that concerns a defendant’s prior convictions.”  
We, of course, remain bound by Almendarez–Torres, because 
only the Supreme Court has the power to overrule one of its 
precedents, even where the viability of that precedent has 
been called into question by subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions.  See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) 
(“We reaffirm that if a precedent of this Court has direct 
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in 
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 Under ACCA, a “serious drug offense” includes “an 
offense under State law, involving manufacturing, 
distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or 
distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of 
the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a 
maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is 
prescribed by law.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).  The State 
law at issue here is Pennsylvania’s Controlled Substance Act, 
which prohibits “the manufacture, delivery, or possession 
with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance 
by a person not registered under this act, . . . or knowingly 
creating, delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a 
counterfeit controlled substance.”  35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780–
113(a)(30).  Section 780–113(f)(1) of Pennsylvania’s 
Controlled Substance Act sets forth the following penalty for 
violating Section 780–113(a)(30) of the statute: 
(f) Any person who violates 
clause . . . (30) of subsection (a) 
with respect to: 
(1) A controlled substance or 
counterfeit substance classified 
in Schedule I or II which is a 
narcotic drug, is guilty of a 
felony and upon conviction 
thereof shall be sentenced to 
                                                                                                     
some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should 
follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court 
the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).      
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imprisonment not exceeding 
fifteen years . . . . 
 
35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780–113(f)(1) (internal footnote omitted).  
Notably, this section disjunctively incorporates all of the 
“controlled substances classified in Schedule I or II” as the 
substances for which a defendant may receive a maximum 
sentence of fifteen years for possession with intent to deliver.  
See id. (footnote omitted).  In order to identify the 
“substances classified in Schedule I or II,” Section 780–
113(f)(1) cross-references Section 780–104 of Pennsylvania’s 
Controlled Substance Act, which provides an exhaustive list 
of controlled substances that fall within each schedule of 
prohibited drugs.  See 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 780–104(1), (2). 
 To determine whether Henderson’s convictions under 
Pennsylvania’s Controlled Substance Act are ACCA 
predicate offenses, we employ a “categorical approach” that 
involves comparing “the elements of the statute forming the 
basis of the defendant’s conviction with the elements of the 
‘generic’ crime—i.e., the offense as commonly understood.”  
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013).  
When applying the categorical approach, we “‘look only to 
the statutory definitions’—i.e., the elements—of a 
defendant’s prior offenses, and not ‘to the particular facts 
underlying those convictions.’”  Id. at 2283 (quoting Taylor v. 
United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990)).  The Supreme 
Court has explained that “[t]he prior conviction qualifies as 
an ACCA predicate only if the statute’s elements are the same 
as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense.”  Id. at 
2281 (emphasis added).  In other words, “when a statute sets 
out a single (or ‘indivisible’) set of elements to define a single 
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crime,” this Court’s analysis is “straightforward” because we 
need only “line[] up that crime’s elements alongside those of 
the generic offense and see[] if they match.”  Mathis v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). 
 Our analysis, however, is not as straightforward when 
faced with statutes that “list[] multiple, alternative elements” 
that must be proven to secure a conviction for violating the 
statute.  See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285.  These statutes are 
known as “divisible statutes,” id. at 2284, because they “list 
elements in the alternative, and thereby define multiple 
crimes.”  Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249.  When faced with 
divisible statutes, we apply a “modified categorical approach” 
that allows us “to consult a limited class of documents . . . to 
determine which alternative formed the basis of the 
defendant’s prior conviction.”  Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281.  
The modified categorical approach permits us to “do what the 
categorical approach demands: compare the elements of the 
crime of conviction (including the alternative element used in 
the case) with the elements of the generic crime.”  Id.; see 
also id. at 2285 (noting that “the modified approach merely 
helps implement the categorical approach when a defendant 
was convicted of violating a divisible statute” because it 
“retains the categorical approach’s central feature: a focus on 
the elements, rather than the facts, of a crime”). 
 In United States v. Abbott, we determined that Section 
780–113(a)(30) of Pennsylvania’s Controlled Substance 
Act—the section that underlies Henderson’s previous 
convictions—is “divisible” and subject to the modified 
categorical approach.  748 F.3d 154, 156 (3d Cir. 2014).  
Henderson argues that Abbott is distinguishable because the 
prior conviction at issue in Abbott involved cocaine, for 
which defendants are sentenced under Section 780–
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113(f)(1.1) of Pennsylvania’s Controlled Substance Act.  35 
Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780–113(f)(1.1).  Here, on the other hand, 
Henderson stresses that his convictions were under Section 
780–113(f)(1), therefore requiring a different analysis 
because the Schedules in Section 780–113(f)(1) contain more 
substances than the federal schedules.4  Because Section 780–
113(f)(1) lists more substances, Henderson contends Section 
780–113(f)(1)’s listing of controlled substances under 
“Schedule I or II” makes Section 780–113(f)(1) indivisible, 
such that the modified categorical approach does not have a 
role to play.  Specifically, he maintains that Section 780–
113(f)(1) is indivisible because he contends it addresses 
different means of committing the offense, rather than 
different elements.  We disagree.  In light of the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Mathis, 136 S. Ct. 2243, we find 
Section 780–113(f)(1) is divisible because it addresses 
different elements of the offense; not the different means of 
committing the offense. 
 In Mathis, the Supreme Court reiterated that we may 
use the categorical approach to analyze a statute if it “lists 
multiple elements disjunctively,” but may not do so if a 
statute “enumerates various factual means of committing a 
single element.”  136 S. Ct. at 2249.  Accordingly, the Court 
explained that “[t]he first task for a sentencing court faced 
with an alternatively phrased statute is thus to determine 
whether its listed items are elements or means.”  Id. at 2256.  
“If they are elements,” the Court explained, we should 
                                              
4 The Government concedes that Schedules I and II 
from Section 780–113(f)(1) contain more drugs than—and 
thus do not completely overlap with—the federal schedules. 
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“review the record materials to discover which of the 
enumerated alternatives played a part in the defendant's prior 
conviction, and then compare that element (along with all 
others) to those of the generic crime.”  Id.  “[I]f instead they 
are means,” however, the Supreme Court explained that we 
have “no call to decide which of the statutory alternatives was 
at issue in the earlier prosecution.”  Id.  
 Given the importance of the threshold inquiry—
elements or means—the Supreme Court stressed that 
“[d]istinguishing between elements and facts is [] central to 
ACCA’s operation.”  136 S. Ct. at 2248.  The Court explained 
that “[e]lements are the constituent parts’ of a crime’s legal 
definition—the things the ‘prosecution must prove to sustain 
a conviction.”  Id. (citation omitted); see also id. (“At a trial, 
they are what the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt to 
convict the defendant; and at a plea hearing, they are what the 
defendant necessarily admits when he pleads guilty.”) 
(internal citations omitted).  By contrast, the Court explained 
that “[f]acts . . . are mere real-world things—extraneous to the 
crime’s legal requirements.”  Id.; see also id. (“They are 
circumstance[s] or event[s] having no legal effect [or] 
consequence: In particular, they need neither be found by a 
jury nor admitted by a defendant.”) (citation omitted).   
 In Mathis, the Supreme Court outlined three methods 
for sentencing courts to make the elements/means 
determination.  First, the sentencing court should ascertain 
whether “a state court decision definitively answers the 
question . . . .”  Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256.  Second, the 
District Judge may look to “the statute on its face,” which 
“may resolve the issue.”  Id.  Finally, explained the Court, “if 
state law fails to provide clear answers,” sentencing courts 
may look to “the record of a prior conviction itself.”  Id.  
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These three approaches confirm that Section 780–113(f)(1) is 
divisible and subject to the modified categorical approach, 
and that the District Court properly found that Henderson’s 
prior convictions were ACCA predicates. 
A.  
 For the first and “easy” method outlined by the 
Supreme Court, we look to see if a Pennsylvania state court 
decision definitively answers the question.  Mathis, 136 S. Ct. 
at 2256.  “When a ruling of that kind exists, a sentencing 
judge need only follow what it says.”  Id. (citing Schad v. 
Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 636 (1991) (plurality opinion)).  In 
Abbott, we recognized that the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
has ruled that the particular type of drug is an element of the 
offense under Section 780–113(a)(30).  See 748 F.3d at 159 
n.4 (citing Commonwealth v. Swavely, 554 A.2d 946 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1989), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 571 
A.2d 382 (Pa. 1989)).  Specifically, as it pertains to the 
delivery of controlled substances under Section 780–
113(a)(30), the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the 
specific type of drug used was an element of the offense; not 
a means of committing the offense.  See Swavely, 554 A.2d at 
949 (“[W]hen the vial containing the two separate drugs was 
delivered, two separate offenses occurred.”).  As the Superior 
Court in Swavely explained:  
[I]n order to find appellant guilty 
of count six, delivery of a 
Schedule IV controlled substance, 
[Drug 1], the jury had to conclude 
that there was a transfer of [Drug 
1] from appellant to another 
person. Thus, delivery of [Drug 1] 
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is not a lesser offense to be 
included within the offense of 
delivery of [Drug 2]. Each offense 
includes an element distinctive of 
the other, i.e. the particular 
controlled substance.  
Id. (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Smith, No. 
1140, 2013 WL 11253788, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 
2013) (“Appellant was found in possession of three different 
controlled substances. Each would support a separate criminal 
count”); Pennsylvania Bar Institute, Pennsylvania Suggested 
Standard Criminal Jury Instructions §§16.01, 16.13 (a)(30)(B) 
(3d Ed. 2016).   
 The same logic applies with respect to Section 780–
113(f)(1).  In order to find Henderson guilty of possession of 
heroin, a jury would have to conclude that Henderson, in fact, 
possessed that specific drug which has been classified as a 
controlled substance in Schedule I or II by the Pennsylvania 
General Assembly.  Those particular controlled substances 
are, thus, distinct elements of the crime; not means of 
committing the crime.5  Therefore, as dictated by the 
                                              
5 This approach is also in accord with our previous 
rulings.  As we explained in United States v. Tucker, 
“[p]ossession (or manufacture, or delivery) of a controlled 
substance is an element of the offense [under Section 780–
113(a)(30)]; to prove it, the prosecution must prove that the 
substance in question was one of those enumerated in 
Pennsylvania’s controlled substance schedules. . . .”  703 F.3d 
205, 215 (3d Cir. 2012).  Henderson contends that 
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 409 A.2d 21 (1979), supports his 
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Pennsylvania state courts, Section 780–113(f)(1) sets forth 
different elements of the offense; not different means.  
B.  
 The second method outlined by the Supreme Court 
leads to the same conclusion.  For the second method, the 
Supreme Court directs us to consider the language of Section 
780–113(f)(1) to make the elements or means distinction.  Cf. 
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256.  Specifically, the Court explained 
that if “statutory alternatives carry different punishments, 
then . . . they must be elements.”  Id. (citations omitted).  On 
the other hand, the Court explained that “if a statutory list is 
drafted to offer ‘illustrative examples,’ then it includes only a 
crime’s means of commission.”  Id. (citing, inter alia, United 
States v. Cabrera-Umanzor, 728 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2013)).  
 Henderson points to the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in 
United States v. Cabrera-Umanzor to support his argument 
that Section 780–113(f)(1) provides different “means” of 
committing the offense rather than different “elements.”  In 
                                                                                                     
argument that the specific Schedule I or II drugs are means 
and not elements.  This same argument was advanced in 
Tucker and Abbott.  Both times “[w]e addressed th[e] 
contention . . . and rejected it.”  Abbott, 748 F.3d at 159 n.5 
(citing Tucker, 703 F.3d at 215–16).  Abbott remains good 
law.  See Avila v. Attorney Gen., 826 F.3d 662, 666 (3d Cir. 
2016) (“The statute under which [petitioner] was convicted, 
35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780–113(a)(30), is divisible with regard 
to both the conduct and the controlled substances to which it 
applies.”) (citing Abbott, 748 F.3d at 159).  We see no reason 
to find otherwise here. 
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Cabrera-Umanzor, however, the Fourth Circuit addressed a 
statute that was fundamentally different from the statute 
before us now because the statute at issue in Cabrera-
Umanzor addressed sexual abuse of children and provided a 
list of sex crimes that Maryland’s highest court found to be 
“‘merely illustrative . . . .’”  728 F.3d. at 353 (quoting Walker 
v. State, 69 A.3d 1066, 1084 (Md. 2013)).  Because 
Maryland’s state courts had deemed the list of sex crimes in 
the statute to be illustrative, the Fourth Circuit rightly found 
that the crimes listed “simply  provide[d] examples of acts 
that come within the [statutory] definition,” and “serve[d] 
only as a non-exhaustive list of various means by which the 
elements of sexual molestation or sexual exploitation can be 
committed.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
 Here, far from offering a list of illustrative examples, 
Section 780–113(f)(1) provides a list of specific statutory 
alternatives by cross-referencing the “Schedule I or II” 
controlled substances listed in Section 780–104—a 
disjunctive and exhaustive list of stand-alone alternative 
definitions that captures the entire universe of substances for 
which defendants may be convicted and given separate 
maximum sentences for possession with intent to deliver 
under Section 780–113(f)(1).6  By cross-referencing Section 
                                              
6 Henderson argues that Section 780–104 of 
Pennsylvania’s Controlled Substance Act provides a non-
exhaustive and “illustrative” list of substances.  He places a 
particular emphasis on Section 780–104’s language stating 
that the “schedules include the controlled substances listed or 
to be listed . . . .” 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-104.  This language, 
however, does not indicate that the schedules are meant to be 
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780–104, Section 780–113(f)(1) criminalizes the possession 
of specific substances listed in Schedules I or II, creating 
several alternative elements; not separate means of 
commission.  Cf. Coronado v. Holder, 759 F.3d 977, 984 (9th 
Cir. 2014), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 1492 (2015) (concluding 
that a California controlled substances statute that “identifies 
a number of California drug schedules and statutes and 
organizes them into five separate groups, which are listed in 
the disjunctive” is divisible and that use of the modified 
categorical approach was appropriate).7  Accordingly, we find 
that, on its face, Pennsylvania’s Controlled Substances Act 
provides a clear answer with respect to the elements or means 
inquiry, and is different from the statute at issue in Cabrera-
                                                                                                     
illustrative.  To the contrary, even though other substances 
may be added or removed through administrative or 
legislative processes, 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780–103, Section 
780–104 specifically indicates that “[t]he [] controlled 
substances [listed] are included in [the] schedules . . . .” 35 
Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 780-104(1), (2); see also 28 Pa. Code § 
25.72 (noting that Section 780–104 “designates specific 
substances for inclusion under the five schedules”) (emphasis 
added).  Thus, Section 780–104 does not provide an 
“illustrative” list of substances, because only the specific 
controlled substances listed in Section 780–104 will fall 
within the purview of Section 780–113(f)(1). 
7 Notably, the statute at issue in Coronado was 
strikingly similar to the statute at issue here, as it provided 
that a person who “possesses any controlled substance which 
is [] classified in Schedule III, IV, or V . . . . shall be punished 
. . . .”  759 F.3d at 983. 
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Umanzor, because Section 780–113(f)(1) provides an 
exhaustive list of all the specific controlled substances that 
the Act intends to cover, thereby creating separate elements.  
Section 780–113(f)(1) does not attempt to illustrate the 
different means of carrying out the offense—i.e., the 
countless ways people may manufacture, distribute, or 
possess the specified controlled substances.8  
C.  
 The third method outlined by the Supreme Court in 
Mathis leads to the same result.  The final method from 
Mathis calls for an examination of “the record of a prior 
conviction itself” in order to make the means or elements 
determination.   136 S. Ct. at 2256.  Specifically, the Court 
explained that sentencing courts may take a “peek at the 
[record] documents [] for the sole and limited purpose of 
determining whether [the listed items are] element[s] of the 
offense.”  Id. at 2256-57 (all alterations in original) (citation 
and quotation omitted).  When taking this peek, the Court 
emphasized that the record materials must “speak plainly . . . . 
                                              
8 Note that the Fourth Circuit has since distinguished 
its Cabrera-Umanzor decision.  See United States v. Vinson, 
794 F.3d 418, 425-26 (4th Cir. 2015) (distinguishing 
Cabrera-Umanzor and concluding that the statute at issue in 
Vinson –  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–33(c)(2) concerning domestic 
violence – was divisible because it was “fundamentally 
different,” as “[t]he nature and operation of the [elements of 
the statute] indicate[d] that they operate as alternate 
definitions or elements for the offense     . . . not alternate 
means of committing the offense.”)  
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to satisfy ‘Taylor’s demand for certainty’ when determining 
whether a defendant was convicted of a generic offense.” Id. 
at 2257(quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 21 
(2005)).  This leads to Henderson’s alternative argument: that 
the documents underlying his felony conviction under Section 
780–113(a)(30) stemming from a January 25, 2004 
indictment do not establish a serious drug offense under 
ACCA.  Again, we disagree and find that the District Court 
did not err in determining that Henderson’s conviction on the 
January 25, 2004 indictment qualifies as a serious drug 
offense under ACCA. 
 Here, the District Court properly looked to 
Henderson’s charging instrument, change of plea form, 
sentencing order, and a conviction document to makes its 
determination that Henderson “pled guilty to and was 
sentenced for a serious drug offense within the meaning of 
the ACCA.”  (App. 11.)  Henderson argues that the 
documents—in particular, the charging instrument and the 
conviction document from the convicting court—did not 
establish with certainty that this conviction was a serious drug 
offense under ACCA.  A review of the record reveals this is 
simply not the case. 
 The conviction at issue here stemmed from “count 
two” of the indictment at “Criminal Action No. 2004[0]-
2883.” (App. 9 (citing (App. 68.)))  Count two of the cited 
indictment specifically states that Henderson was charged 
with possessing “Heroin.”  (App. 68.)  Because the second 
qualifying conviction was for heroin, we find that the District 
Court did not err by looking to Henderson’s charging 
instrument to make the determination that Henderson’s 
second qualifying conviction was a serious drug offense 
under ACCA. 
18 
 
 With respect to the conviction document relied upon 
by the District Court, Henderson contends that the conviction 
document used was not proper because it was not his “actual” 
conviction document.9  Actual conviction documents, 
however, are not required to provide the requisite certainty 
demanded by the Supreme Court.  See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 
26 (explaining that sentencing courts may look to “the 
charging document . . .  or . . . some comparable judicial 
record of this information”) (emphasis added); see also 
United States v. Howard, 599 F.3d 269, 272 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“This Court has never established a per se rule that certified 
copies of a conviction must be offered by the government 
before a judge may determine a defendant’s career offender 
status”).  Indeed, we have deemed “other reliable judicial 
records,” id. at 273, to be sufficient, including incomplete 
certified conviction records and docket entries because we 
have found that “both . . . are ‘records of the convicting 
court.’”  Id. at 272–73 (quoting Shepard, 544 U.S. at 23) 
(footnote omitted).   
 The District Court relied on a form entitled, “Report of 
Courts Showing the Conviction of Certain Violations of the 
Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.”  
(App. 70.)  This form is a reliable judicial record.10 Thus, 
                                              
9 Henderson’s actual conviction document is not in the 
record.  
10 The “Report of Courts” form was completed by the 
Clerk of Courts in the Court of Common Pleas for Allegheny 
Pennsylvania and was “to be used for reporting the [] listed 
violations of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and 
Cosmetic Act . . . .” (App. 70.)  Notably, this judicial record 
 
19 
 
there was no error in considering it along with the other 
mutually corroborating records relied upon by the District 
Court.  These “are the type of judicial records that are 
permissible for sentencing courts to use to establish past 
convictions for sentencing purposes.” Howard, 599 F.3d at 
273; cf. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 23.  Thus, the District Court 
properly determined that Henderson’s conviction on the 
January 24, 2004 indictment involved heroin, which is a 
controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 802, and was a 
predicate offense for the imposition of ACCA’s fifteen-year 
minimum sentence.  
IV.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of conviction and sentence. 
                                                                                                     
from the convicting court indicated that Henderson was 
convicted of violating Section 780–113(a)(30), and 
specifically indicated that the violation was a felony.  
Because this form was a “record[] of the convicting court,” 
Howard, 599 F.3d at 273 (quoting Shepard, 544 U.S. at 23), 
we find that the form was a reliable judicial record. 
